Jose H. Blanchet, Martin I. Reiman, Virag Shah, Lawrence M. Wein, Linjia Wu (2022) Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities. Operations Research 70(6):3355-3370. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2186
Abstract
We consider a matching market where buyers and sellers arrive according to independent Poisson processes at the same rate and independently abandon the market if not matched after an exponential amount of time with the same mean. In this centralized market, the utility for the system manager from matching any buyer and any seller is a general random variable. We consider a sequence of systems indexed by n where the arrivals in the nth system are sped up by a factor of n. We analyze two families of one-parameter policies: the population threshold policy immediately matches an arriving agent to its best available mate only if the number of mates in the system is above a threshold, and the utility threshold policy matches an arriving agent to its best available mate only if the corresponding utility is above a threshold. Using an asymptotic fluid analysis of the two-dimensional Markov process of buyers and sellers …
Authors
Jose H Blanchet, Martin I Reiman, Virag Shah, Lawrence M Wein, Linjia Wu
Publication date
2022/11
Journal
Operations Research
Volume
70
Issue
6
Pages
3355-3370
Publisher
INFORMS
